

The Gentle Nudge:

The Canadian Department of External Affairs and the North Atlantic Treaty, 1948-1949

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on 18 August 2006

The period of 1945-1956 is often referred to as the “Golden Age” in Canadian diplomacy because of Canada’s perceived influence on international affairs. It has been generally argued that this is the case because of a combination of factors including the development of Canadian diplomatic capacity and a somewhat inflated global significance because of Europe’s slow recovery from the war. One important example of this influence was in the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) from March 1948 to April 1949, in which the Canadian government participated in talks at a global political level as yet unparalleled in Canada’s diplomatic history and which were generally credited with being responsible for an article calling for broader non-military cooperation (Article 2). As a result, the Canadian historiography on the topic has focused disproportionately on Canada’s role in securing a general welfare clause in the treaty. This paper will assess the significance of Canada’s participation in NAT negotiations of 1948-1949 through an extensive analysis of the primary sources. By following the Canadian participation through the four stages of negotiations, it will seek to contribute a fresh interpretation of Canada’s participation by centering on the systemic and personal factors within the Canadian Department of External Affairs that contributed to Canada’s negotiation of the treaty.

The historiography on Canadian participation in the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty is quite extensive. The most detailed piece is Escott Reid’s “A Time of Hope and Fear”, in which he describes, from his personal involvement, the Canadian contributions to NAT negotiations. These reflections, however, are tempered by his highly subjective recollections of events which place undue blame on Ambassador Hume Wrong and on

US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Still, it is essential reading and produces several recollections of some use to a fuller understanding of Canada's role in the origins of NATO. James Eayrs' In Defence of Canada, vol. 4: Growing Up Allied", drawing upon extensive use of archival materials, provides a more objective analysis of the negotiations. Eayrs also contributes the most complete analysis on the planning of the military side of NATO.

More recently John Milloy's published thesis "NATO: Community or Alliance" provides a detailed and enlightening analysis of the negotiation of the social and economic provisions of the Treaty. His first chapter assesses the negotiations of Article 2 on General Welfare and concludes that the article was considered by many to be a political favour to the Canadian Government rather than a particularly important article to the treaty. Milloy's extensive use of American, British and French documents provides a deeper understanding of Canadian efforts to establish a North Atlantic community. Adam Chapnick's essay "Making Wrong Right" makes use of the "much neglected" Hume Wrong papers to situate Canada's conduct in the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations within the "functionalist tradition". Chapnick's analysis, although strong in its response to Reid's interpretation, seems to pay more attention to the functionalist debate than may be justified by the subject. Hector Mackenzie's essay "Canada, the Cold War and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty", which provides an analysis based on the Documents on Canadian External Relations, does not diverge from the interpretations of others like Eayrs and Chapnick, but provides a nuanced understanding based on the documents.

In general, the Canadian historiography on the topic has focused disproportionately on Canada's role in securing a general welfare clause in the treaty and on the disagreements of Canadian diplomats throughout the negotiations. Although this also occupied a major portion of the dispatches and documents, this probably has not been the most important or lasting of Canada's contributions to the origins of NATO. This essay will draw attention to some of Canada's understated contributions to the negotiations including its role in reassuring American doubts in the early stages of the Treaty. It will do this by highlighting the efficacy of Canadian diplomacy, particularly through the role of personalities in drafting the treaty and the Departmental context in which they operated.

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With the end of the Second World War and the dawning of the United Nations, the world began to look toward picking up the pieces and reconstructing a fractured Europe. The United Nations came to embody much of the hope for a peaceful and cooperative world. This optimism was quickly dissolved as it became clear that the war-time unity of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union no longer existed and that the emerging Cold War would paralyze the organization built to maintain stability upon the assumption of great power cooperation. As a result, confidence in the UN's ability to mediate international aggression rapidly disappeared. It became clear that the international system would be divided into two worlds by a bipolar system of suspicion and tension. Among the first public articulations of the divided world was Winston

Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. His words captured the nature and the implications of a shifting world order.

In Canada, the post-war optimism was also short-lived. In September 1945 a former cipher-clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko, fled the Russian embassy with 109 documents proving the existence of a Soviet spy ring in Canada. The Gouzenko affair had a "scare effect" on all Canadian civil servants as it became increasingly clear to Canada's Department of External Affairs that the UN could not provide a forum for international cooperation and that the Soviet Union sought to consolidate much of Eastern Europe.¹ In September 1947 Canadian Minister of External Affairs Louis St. Laurent riveted the UN General Assembly with his suggestion that democratic countries might pursue security by forming a closer association within the framework of the UN Charter. This statement was the first by any western leader advocating regional security arrangements as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. As American journalist Don Cook reflects on the effect of the speech: "If the Canadians could perceive the need for North America to join an Atlantic Pact, could the Americans lag far behind?"² In the background, Canadian officials consistently raised the matter with American officials and quietly sought to encourage American thinking on the topic.³

Understanding the development of the North Atlantic Treaty is, to an important extent, understanding the Cold War context in which the treaty was negotiated. As British diplomat Sir Nicholas Henderson notes, by mid-1947 any pretence of Soviet cooperation

¹ Menzies, Arthur, Interview: 29 July 2006.

² Cook, Don. *Forging the Alliance, NATO 1945-1950* London: Secker & Warburg, 1989, pp. 166

³ Reid, Escott. *A Time of Hope and Fear*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1977, pp. 34

had disappeared with the elimination of non-communist opposition in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.⁴ Although it was generally assumed that it would not risk open war, the Soviet Union was able to aid communist forces indirectly and through armed intimidation.⁵ Western alarm came to an important peak when in February 1948 a communist coup in Prague eliminated the remaining democratic forces. Three weeks after the coup Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was found dead having fallen from his fourth floor window into the courtyard of Czernin Palace, the Czech Foreign Ministry.⁶ Gladwyn Jebb of the British Foreign Office recalled in his memoirs: “The effect of this was electric.”⁷ Czechoslovakia had represented a degree of cooperation between democratic and communist forces in central Europe. More important, the popular and well-connected Masaryk had come to symbolize bridge-building between the east and west.⁸ That same week, the Soviet Union sent a formal letter to Finnish President Juho Paasikivi requesting the negotiation of a friendship treaty. The Finns would eventually ceded naval base rights to the Soviet Union.⁹ In a final piece of alarming news, on 8 March 1948 Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange informed the British and American Ambassadors in Oslo that he had learned from reliable sources that he would soon be approached with a similar proposal of friendship as Finland. It seemed like Europe was collapsing and being pulled into the Soviet orbit one piece at time. In an NBC interview in April 1949 US Republican Foreign Policy advisor John Foster Dulles

⁴ Henderson, Sir Nicholas. *The Birth of NATO*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. pp. xiii

⁵ Bohlen, Charles. *Witness to History, 1929-1969*. New York: Norton & Company Inc. 1973, pp. 267

⁶ Cook, pp. 119

⁷ Jebb, Gladwyn. *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn*. London: Wedenfeld & Nicholson, 1972, pp. 213

⁸ Cook, pp. 121

⁹ Cook, pp. 123

reflected that 10 of 30 European states had fallen into the Soviet orbit since the end of the Second World War.¹⁰

The impact of the Czech coup and Lange's warnings was to strengthen western resolve to deter this perceived Soviet aggression. The presence of significant communist forces in Italy and France, as well as Soviet pressure on Greece, Turkey and Iran also contributed to the urgency in the west. In the United Kingdom, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin recognized that a bold move was necessary. This thinking crystallized in January 1948 when Bevin called on a broader association of western nations to "...organize ethical and spiritual forces of Western Europe backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas..."¹¹ The speech, inferential toward American association, initiated the process toward the Brussels Treaty and eventually the North Atlantic Treaty. In March 1948, Britain signed the Brussels Pact with Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, toward their common defence. Despite this, the five countries could provide little more than token resistance to the Soviet Union and needed American support of their efforts. Despite Bevin's hope of American support, it was far from assured and the Brussels Pact represented a bold risk.¹² In the United States support for then US Secretary of State George Marshall's European Recovery Plan (the "Marshall Plan") and a stronger military backing of the Western European democracies was growing.¹³ The State Department secretly began planning for

¹⁰ *Documents of the Truman Presidency*. pp. 69

¹¹ *Documents on Canadian External Relations: 1948, Volume 14*. Clement Atlee to Mackenzie King 14 January 1948

¹² Jebb, pp. 214

¹³ Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope*. New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1956. pp. 246

military support to Europe, whether that took the form of military aid or a more formal proposal.

With world events developing so rapidly, the Canadian government resolved to take action to stem the rising Soviet-tide. On 15 March 1948 Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King reflected in his diaries on the tense international situation, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the threats to Scandinavian independence, as well as communist forces in Italy and parts of Asia. Although he felt immediate war was unlikely, there remained considerable danger.¹⁴ As a result, Canada began to reconsider its approach to cold war, as Canadian High Commissioner in London Norman Robertson noted on 10 March 1948:

The expansion of Soviet influence as manifested lately by events in Czechoslovakia, pressure on Finland and Greece and internally in Italy represents an increasing threat to the countries of Western Europe and the traditions of freedom and democracy for which they stand. It has become necessary accordingly to re-examine our European policy.¹⁵

With the recognition that the US- Soviet rivalry would become the central feature of the post-war order, a greater amount of quiet Canadian diplomacy followed in an effort to establish a firm basis for reforming the Transatlantic Alliance.¹⁶ On the advent of the Brussels treaty, Prime Minister King promised full Canadian support for the Brussels Treaty in Parliament. Although King was somewhat uneasy with British Prime Minister

¹⁴ Mackenzie King, W.L. *Mackenzie King's Diaries* <http://king.archives.ca/EN/>, 15 March 1948

¹⁵ Department of External Affairs. *Documents in Canada External Relations Documents; Volume 14-1948*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994, pp. 421

¹⁶ Menzies Interview, 29 January 2006. Menzies noted that, although many of the details were confined to a small group, there was perhaps a great degree of awareness in the Department of the planning and quiet diplomacy being undertaken. He suggested that there was both a greater awareness and diplomacy than some sources indicate.

Clement Atlee's references to "Commonwealth", he was unwilling to block the Department's suggestions.¹⁷

Since the circle of officials familiar with the NAT talks was so small, the personalities of the negotiators and the relationships between them were quite significant. The "NATO spirit", born in the Working Party, was a function of the informality and frank nature of the discussions.¹⁸ It is also evident that the spirit and personal nature of the working group resulted in a number of close personal relationships.¹⁹ Also significant for the character of the talks, certainly relative to other multilateral negotiations, is the robust role played by the diplomats and civil servants in negotiating the treaty. Reid recalls that, to some degree, this was deliberately nurtured by the negotiators by emphasizing the exploratory and non-committal nature of the talks to allow the negotiators maximum flexibility in the negotiations.²⁰ As a result of the important role of personalities in the NAT negotiations, this essay will feature Canada's principle negotiators and speculate on the role their personalities may have played. The most active Canadians at the NAT talks were: Lester B. Pearson, Hume Wrong, Thomas A. Stone and Escott Reid.

Lester B. Pearson served through the negotiations both as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and, from October 1948 onwards, as Secretary of State. His involvement in the early stages of the treaty was quite extensive both in the Tripartite

¹⁷ Pearson, Lester B. *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*. Vol. 2: 1948-1957. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. pp. 43

¹⁸ Reid, pp. 55-57, Devine, Ellen Interview, 17 July 2006.

¹⁹ Devine, Ellen Interview, 17 July 2006. Ms Ellen Devine, Thomas A. Stone's daughter, noted a memento that the Working Party had created a silver cigarette box with all the negotiators names on it to commemorate their work through 1948 and 1949.

²⁰ Reid, pp. 74-75

discussions and the Washington Exploratory Talks. In the period from October through most of December 1948, Pearson would be absent from Ottawa and was, therefore, less active. Pearson had a very strong sense of morality that has been referred to as “the Protestant Missionary Tradition”, a certain affinity for moral “causes”. For Pearson, the NAT became one of these causes.²¹ Personally, Pearson “maintained a certain boyish charm and humour in his relations” and “paid kind attention to what one was trying to say.... He could absorb the essence and ask natural probing questions; this disposition made him very popular in diplomacy.²² Accordingly, Pearson was an international figure of great stature and prestige and, therefore, contributed much to Canada’s participation in the NAT negotiations.²³ On a personal level, Pearson had very close relationships with both J.D. Hickerson (Director of European Affairs in the US State Department) and Lewis Douglas (US Ambassador to the UK). In the case of Hickerson, he’d been a tennis partner with him in the 1920s.²⁴

Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador to the US, served as a Canada’s principle representative throughout the negotiations. Wrong was the “the most incisive of the senior officials” in his thinking and the “crispest” in his writing.²⁵ He was long described by Norman Robertson as “the most able man in the service.” Wrong was considered “brilliant” although “somewhat on the assertive side”.²⁶ This assertive side could border

²¹ Creighton, Donald. *The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976. pp. 167-170

²² Menzies, Arthur , Interview: 29 July 2006. & Bothwell Papers, file 16, *Interview with J.D. Hickerson*. 12 December 1978

²³ LAC, *Claxton Draft Memoirs*. Chapter: *NATO*. pp. 19-20

²⁴ Pearson, Geoffrey. *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993. pp. 33-34 & Bothwell Papers, file 16, *Interview with J.D. Hickerson*. 12 December 1978

²⁵ Menzies, Arthur , Interview: 29 July 2006.

²⁶ Bothwell Papers, file 16, *Interview with J.D. Hickerson*. 12 December 1978

on impatience or waspishness. In diplomacy, Wrong was of a very practical and organized nature, seeking clear Canadian interests with fewer abstract notions or moral preoccupations. Wrong was extremely well-connected with the State Department and highly respected.²⁷ Hickerson described him as “one of my best friends.”²⁸ Wrong was also a close personal friend of Dean Acheson (US Secretary of State from January 1949) in a relationship that dated back to their childhood.²⁹

During the negotiations, Escott Reid served as the Assistant Undersecretary of State and Acting Undersecretary of State in Pearson’s absence. From Ottawa, Reid’s primary role was to draft Canadian instructions and correspond with Pearson. Reid, formerly a Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, had a very “broad view of the world” and was a “very able draftsman”. Reid, like Pearson, had a very profound sense of spirituality in the practice of diplomacy. This sense of “spirituality” informed much of Reid’s internationalism.³⁰ Reid’s admitted weaknesses of “perfectionism and *trop de zèle*” sometimes got in the way of his work.³¹

Thomas A. Stone, the Canadian Minister in Washington, served more extensively than any Canadian during the NAT negotiations. Having grown up in Chatham ON, Stone was a close friend of Pearson’s from their childhood.³² In terms of his personality, Henderson describes Stone as having a “great good nature” and being “particularly

²⁷ Pearson, pp. 47

²⁸ Bothwell Papers, file 16, *Interview with J.D. Hickerson*. 12 December 1978

²⁹ Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969, pp. 277

³⁰ Menzies, Arthur , Interview: 29 July 2006.

³¹ Reid, pp. 231

³² Howell, Spencer Interview, 30 June 2006.

benign”.³³ Stone’s opinions were essentially internationalist, however, with a greater hint of pragmatism than Reid or Pearson. In Washington, Stone was particularly well-connected having started his career there as a Third Secretary in 1927.³⁴ In the embassy in Washington, Stone was seen as indispensable to the point that Wrong sought to delay Stone’s departure from Washington in the summer of 1949 (for an Ambassadorship in Sweden).³⁵ Stone, a great entertainer, played musically³⁶ and, according to Pearson, his parties were “famous on two continents”.³⁷ These parties were a known-forum for high-level diplomacy. Stone maintained close personal relations with Acheson, Hickerson and Theodore Achilles and “very often saw them socially”. He had an especially close personal friendship with Achilles and,³⁸ as a result, one can observe that nearly all conversations with Achilles are made through Stone.³⁹

The period of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty was also a time of important transition and development within the practice and apparatus of Canadian foreign policy. As early as 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s energy and vigor began to decline and by April 1948 he had announced his intention to retire. The period following the Second World War had already represented a “remarkable revolution” in Canadian foreign policy in which King’s monopoly on decision-making began to ebb. Many point to the dispute over Canadian participation in the UN Temporary Commission on Korea in

³³ Henderson, pp. 58

³⁴ Holmes Papers, vol. 58 file 2. *Thomas A. Stone Bio*. November 1965.

³⁵ LAC, Pearson Papers, vol. 17, Wrong to Pearson, 2 March 1949.

³⁶ Devine, Ellen Interview, 17 July 2006, Howell, Spencer Interview, 30 June 2006, Menzies, Arthur , Interview: 29 July 2006.

³⁷ Pearson, pp. 60

³⁸ Devine, Ellen Interview, 17 July 2006

³⁹ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 8 May 2006, 497-499; LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 32, Stone to Reid, 24 January 1949

1948 (UNTCOK) as the symbolic power shift from King's caution to Louis St. Laurent's internationalism both in cabinet and in the Department.⁴⁰ In the Department there was a "realization that we were moving into a new period" and a "considerable broadening" of Canada's agenda.⁴¹

In November 1948 Louis St. Laurent became Prime Minister; Lester Pearson had already shifted from a career in the Foreign Service to assume the position of Minister of External Affairs. St. Laurent and Pearson would form a close working relationship based on mutual respect and a shared vision of an active Canadian foreign policy.⁴² Their period, often considered part of the "golden age" of Canadian diplomacy, was invigorated by a sense of purpose, a "shared pride and belonging to a damn good service."⁴³

Although Pearson and St. Laurent made a quick and easy transition to their new roles, these changes were accompanied by myriad administrative challenges, which had an impact on Canada's negotiation of the NAT. Since the post-war explosion in the size and role of the Department, its administration had suffered in its transition from a small, informal Department to a large complex instrument of an active foreign policy.⁴⁴ Since April 1948 the Department had already lacked an Associate Undersecretary since Laurent Beaudry, who replaced Wrong in Ottawa in September 1946, was forced into retirement

⁴⁰ Heeney, Arnold. *The things that are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian public servant*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. pp. 93. Menzies, Arthur Interview: 29 July 2006

⁴¹ Menzies, Arthur Interview, 29 July 2006

⁴² Pearson, Lester B. *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*. Vol. 1: 1897-1948 Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. pp. 294

⁴³ Menzies, Arthur Interview. 29 July 2006.

⁴⁴ Hilliker, John & Barry, Donald. *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 2: Coming of Age, 1946-1968*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995. pp. 4. Hilliker notes that the Department had grown from 1946 to 1948 from 26 to 44 missions; 770 staff to 1213; 132 officers to 216, and; an annual budget of \$7 million to \$14.5 million.

because of poor health.⁴⁵ In the period following Pearson's departure from the Department, Escott Reid, the Assistant Undersecretary of State, served as Acting Undersecretary. This acute shortage of senior staff was exacerbated when Pearson kept the office and staff he had as Undersecretary. Reid, already consumed with an extensive international agenda, including the NAT negotiations, had to create a new Undersecretary's office.⁴⁶

As a result, Arnold Heeney, previously Clerk of the Privy Council Office and an able administrator, succeeded Pearson as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs on 15 March 1949. Of his appointment Heeney said: "I have no doubt that one of the reasons why Pearson invited me to become his deputy was so that I might undertake the extensive reorganization which the department quite obviously required."⁴⁷ Under Heeney the Department established a much more formal administration in Ottawa, including the appointment of three Assistant Undersecretaries to handle the workload and the establishment of a more formal liaison between the Departments of National Defence and Trade and Commerce.⁴⁸

Following Bevin's speech in January 1948, which was warmly received in the US, British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel approached US Undersecretary Robert Lovett about entering into a general commitment with Britain to "reinforce the Western

⁴⁵ Hilliker & Barry, pp. 9-10

⁴⁶ Reid, pp.231

⁴⁷ Heeney, pp. 98

⁴⁸ Heeney, pp. 99

European defence project”.⁴⁹ Lovett, concerned about the reaction of Congress to another State Department initiative for Europe, was cool to Bevin’s initiative.⁵⁰ With the coup in Prague and the Norway’s warnings, however, a greater sense of urgency gripped the West by March 1948. Thus, when on 11 March, Inverchapel delivered an aide-mémoire from Bevin to US Secretary of State George Marshall suggesting collaboration, Marshall immediately approved exploratory talks between Britain, the United States and Canada to begin in Washington on 22 March 1948.

This essay will be structured along chronological lines, following the development of the negotiations step-by-step. The negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty took place in four stages. The first was the Tripartite American, British and Canadian talks in Washington, which lasted from 22 March to 1 April 1948 and resulted in the Pentagon proposals. The second stage of negotiations was conducted between six countries (Belgium, Canada, France, The Netherlands, UK and US) from 6 July to 9 September 1948 and resulted in the Washington Paper. The third stage, which lasted from 10-24 December 1948, produced a Draft Treaty and included Luxembourg. The final stage, which included the seven governments lasted from 10 January to 28 March and finalized the NAT.

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⁴⁹ Henderson, pp. 7-8

⁵⁰ Truman, pp. 246

The tripartite talks were so secret that they remained secret for over twenty years.⁵¹ The reasons for Canada's participation in such exclusive talks given their size and power relative to its two North Atlantic neighbors has often been speculated. Sir Nicholas Henderson notes that Canada was invited "because of their special strategic position and the intimate relations which existed between her and the US and UK."⁵² A further explanation for Canada's privileged position in NATO is found in Brooke Claxton's Memoirs:

...we had taken a major part in the war; we had worked closely with Britain and the United States with each we had special ties; we had continued after the war our defence planning with the Americans and the British... we had not only paid our own way, but would continue to do so, but we had supplied large quantities of arms to others and would certainly do so in the future... most important of all, our officials and officers had an envied reputation for competence and honesty and were more experienced than most... Mike Pearson's position was unique in that to his great ability he added far more experience of international affairs than any of his opposite members.⁵³

Canada's position was, therefore, based on its contributions as well as the close relationships between Canadian officials and both the British and American officials. The importance of these factors was again demonstrated in separate ABC (American-British-Canadian) talks convened in Washington on 15 April 1948 between defence planning staffs to establish emergency defence plans.⁵⁴ These tripartite talks occurred almost continuously throughout 1948, with the French joining in later stages.⁵⁵

⁵¹ The existence of the Pentagon talks remained secret to the other NAT powers throughout the entire negotiations. The first mention of these talks was published in 1972 in Glawdyn Jebb's Memoirs.

⁵² Henderson, pp. 14

⁵³ LAC, Claxton Draft Memoirs, Chapter: *NATO* pp. 19-20

⁵⁴ DHH, Foulkes Papers, *Foulkes Memorandum of Washington Meeting* 12 April 1948.

⁵⁵ Claxton Memoirs, *NATO*, pp. 11

The tripartite meetings commenced on 22 March 1948 with Canada being represented by Pearson, General Charles Foulkes (Chief of General Staff), Thomas A. Stone (Canadian Minister in Washington), and Hume Wright (the 3rd Secretary in the Washington Embassy).⁵⁶ Ambassador Wrong eventually joined the negotiations once Pearson had left for Ottawa. Such high secrecy was observed that Pearson developed an elaborate cover story of covering for his absence from Ottawa.⁵⁷ The security measures were so high that Pearson did not even risk mentioning the visit in his personal agenda.⁵⁸

Outside of the assumed security benefits, there were a number of reasons why the concept of a North Atlantic Treaty was so appealing to Prime Minister King and officials in the Department of External Affairs. First, it provided a convenient reason for King to abandon conversations with the United States about a potential Free Trade Agreement. King instead requested that Canada pursue closer trade collaboration with the signatories of the NAT.⁵⁹ Second, it would provide another avenue for Canada to avoid an unequal bilateral defence relationship with the United States that could invite an undue invasion on Canadian sovereignty.⁶⁰ A third consideration is pursuit of another avenue to constrain the actions of the United States, which might result in a conflict.⁶¹ Lastly, it satisfied Canadian sentimentality for close defence ties with the British and, therefore,

⁵⁶ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 23 March 1948 pp. 445-447

⁵⁷ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 13 March 1948, pp. 428-429

⁵⁸ LAC, Pearson Papers MG 26 N6, volume 10

⁵⁹ DCER v. 14, St. Laurent to Wrong- 31 March 1948, pp. 1052-1053, Holmes, pp.92

⁶⁰ DCER v. 14, Pearson Memo- 1 June 1948, pp. 506

⁶¹ Holmes, John. *The Shaping of peace, vol. 2*, Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1982. pp. 100

cured Canada's "split-personality on defence matters."⁶² For these reasons, the principle preoccupation of the early Canadian negotiations in Washington was to secure a broader security pact that would include the United States.

The specific character of the alliance that Canada sought at the tripartite meetings was somewhat less clear. The principle areas of discussion at the Tripartite talks would be on the membership of the pact and its obligations.⁶³ Prior to his departure Assistant Undersecretary of State Escott Reid forwarded Pearson an extensive draft advocating a broader alliance, which provided for a "spiritual mobilizations of the liberal democracies". This pact would eventually encompass all the liberal democratic states outside the Soviet sphere with a reciprocal defence obligation stronger than in the Brussels Pact model in many respects.⁶⁴ In contrast, Canadian Minister in Washington, Thomas Stone, forwarded a contrasting dispatch to Pearson requesting that he should keep in mind the need to "...devote ourselves to what is obviously our common purpose by the simplest possible direct approach and to put what democratic trimmings on it as may be required later."⁶⁵ Pearson's approach to the negotiations probably lay somewhere between the two positions.

On the issue of membership, Pearson argued that the Brussels Pact should be absorbed into the broader Atlantic Pact, which could also include Norway, Sweden, Italy and Greece. For Pearson, the membership issue was closely tied to the obligation. He sought

⁶² Eayrs, James. *In Defence of Canada: Growing up Allied*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1980, pp. 67

⁶³ DCER v. 14, Pearson to King, 14 March 1948, pp. 430-432

⁶⁴ DCER v. 14, Reid to Pearson, 18 March 1948, pp. 435-439

⁶⁵ DCER v. 14, Stone to Pearson, 22 March 1948, pp. 441-442

to ensure that "...the purpose of the pact is to rally the spiritual as well as the military and economic resources of Western Christendom against Soviet totalitarianism."⁶⁶

Therefore, since membership was dictated by the nature of the obligation, a potential member's democratic credentials were of great importance.

Pearson helped frame the early discussions on the treaty obligation by observing that the US action could take one of three forms: a Presidential statement more firmly backing the Brussels Pact, the accession of the US (and Canada) to the Brussels Pact, or a wider Atlantic Pact.⁶⁷ The Canadian delegates opposed the idea of an American declaration without further steps because it lacked the quality of reciprocity and would therefore be open to political attack in North America and Europe.⁶⁸ Canada also opposed the idea of accession with the United States to the Brussels treaty because, although American accession would have an important political effect, Canada's accession would not and would therefore make it desirable to invite other countries like Australia and Brazil.⁶⁹ This idea was eventually dropped, largely because of the American support for Western European unity.⁷⁰

As the discussions developed, Pearson joined Hickerson and Gladwyn Jebb (the Assistant Undersecretary of State in the British Foreign Office) on a working committee that agreed to limit the membership of the alliance to Western Europe and North

⁶⁶ DCER v. 14, Pearson to King, 14 March 1948, pp. 430-432

⁶⁷ DCER v. 14, Pearson to Reid, 23 March 1948, pp. 445-447

⁶⁸ DCER v. 14, Pearson to King, 27 March 1948, pp. 455-462

⁶⁹ DCER v. 14, Pearson to King, 27 March 1948, pp. 455-462

⁷⁰ Reid, pp. 69

America.⁷¹ Upon returning to Ottawa, Pearson had a long talk with Prime Minister King who was anxious to include both a note on economic cooperation in the preamble as well as in an article. Pearson then conveyed this wish to Wrong, who had taken over for Pearson in Washington.⁷² Wrong discussed the concept of social and economic collaboration with Hickerson and the request was reflected in a State Department draft of the treaty.⁷³

On the issue of “the pledge”, the final draft, produced on 1 April 1948, more closely resembled the pledge of the Rio Pact⁷⁴ than the Brussels Pact. The final version also included the explicit provisions that members would only act on aggression “...*which it considers* an armed attack against any other party...” as well as “each one of the Contracting *Parties shall determine* the immediate measures which it will individually take in fulfillment of the obligation...”⁷⁵ Pearson and Wrong argued strongly that the pledge should be strengthened and issued a formal note to Hickerson forwarding Canadian three proposals, which sought to leave the qualifications contained in the draft implicit rather than explicit.⁷⁶ The suggestions were favorably received by Hickerson, who proposed to study them more carefully. The joint proposals, however, were now out of Canadian hands and would be submitted as a purely State Department document called

⁷¹ DCER v. 14, Pearson to Reid, 23 March 1948, pp. 445-447

⁷² DCER v. 14, Pearson to Wrong, 29 March 1948, pp. 462-463

⁷³ DCER v.14, Wrong to Pearson, 31 March 1948, pp. 463-465

⁷⁴ The Rio Pact was a mutual defence arrangement the United States signed in 1947 with 21 American Republics.

⁷⁵ DCER v. 14, Memorandum by Participants in United States/ United Kingdom/ Canada Security Talks, 1 April 1948, 480-482

⁷⁶ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Hickerson, 1 April 1948, pp. 471

the “Pentagon Proposals” for submission to the US Administration and a few Congressional leaders.⁷⁷

The “Pentagon Proposals” contained four major items: (1) That the Brussels treaty should be expanded to include, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden; (2) That the President should announce his intention to hold a conference to conclude a Security Pact under Article 51 of the Charter to provide military, economic and other assistance; (3) The President should also declare US military backing of all the Brussels Treaty Powers, and; (4) Simultaneously, the US and the UK should declare their support for the independence and integrity of Greece, Iran and Turkey.⁷⁸ Unknown at the time, these Proposals would come to very closely resemble the final North Atlantic Treaty. Despite fairly advanced proposals contained in the “Pentagon Papers” on the nature of an Atlantic Pact, Hickerson repeatedly cautioned the British and Canadian officials that a Presidential declaration may be the strongest possible pledge the United States could provide.⁷⁹

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Hickerson’s caution was well-founded. Although Canadian negotiators left the Washington talks expecting the treaty to be concluded by May 1948⁸⁰, they would soon discover that the US consultations and world events would conspire to delay the conclusion of the treaty for a over year. The seeds of these delays may have been found

⁷⁷ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 2 April 1948, pp. 476-477

⁷⁸ FRUS 1948, v. 3, Pentagon Proposals, pp. 70-75

⁷⁹ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 7 April 1948, pp. 483-486

⁸⁰ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 2 April 1948, pp. 476-477

in the nature of the Washington talks themselves. First, the talks had occurred while two of the State Department's foremost experts in Soviet policy, George F. Kennan and Charles Bohlen, were absent from Washington. Kennan would later write in his memoirs: "Unhappy over the paper the staff had submitted during my absence in Japan, but feeling partially committed by it, I wrote another in June, trying to put on the brakes."⁸¹ Kennan and Bohlen would present an important challenge to Hickerson and Achilles' pursuit of a broader Atlantic Treaty. Kennan argued that a formal Treaty was unnecessary because the existing presence of American troops in Germany combined with a Presidential declaration and military aid provided the greatest measure of security possible.⁸² These arguments were strengthened when Paul-Henri Spaak (the Belgian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) visited Washington and gave lukewarm support to the idea of an Atlantic Alliance and emphasized the need for concrete military aid.⁸³ The internal debates within the State Department for the support of Marshall and Lovett would cause considerable delay in the talks.⁸⁴ The second important cause of delay was what Pearson called the Soviet "appeasement offensive". The urgency brought about by the Czech coup and Lange's warnings had dissipated, while the defeat of communism in the Italian election and the reduction of pressure on Norway eliminated the sense of emergency in the State Department.⁸⁵ Some have speculated that the presence of Soviet spy Donald D. Maclean in the Pentagon Talks may have lead to critical reductions

⁸¹ Kennan, George F., *Memoirs: 1925-1950*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company:1967, pp. 409. It should also be noted that, although Charles Bohlen accepts the inevitability of the NAT in his Memoirs (pp. 267), he was an important opponent of the treaty in this period.

⁸² Kennan, pp. 407-409

⁸³ Henderson, pp. 21-22, 25

⁸⁴ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 25, Pearson to Wrong, 9 April 1948

⁸⁵ Cook, pp.130

in Soviet pressure, particularly in Norway.⁸⁶ Although this is mere speculation, it is certainly an interesting wrinkle in the NAT's development.

In the Department of External Affairs, the initial optimism that followed the Pentagon talks was replaced by concern over the lull in conversations. On 8 April 1948 Hickerson noted to Wrong that Lovett was not completely convinced about the necessity for the security proposals. Learning of Kennan and Bohlen's opposition, an alarmed Pearson confided in Wrong that it was "wrong and possibly dangerous", and that "I have the unhappy feeling that the big moment has passed when a genuine regional security arrangement could be negotiated on a reciprocal basis under Article 51 and that the United States is relapsing into policies which are short-sighted and insufficient." The Undersecretary instructed Wrong to communicate the Canadian concerns in an informal way to State Department officials.⁸⁷

The Canadian government would make one of its most understated contributions to the development of the North Atlantic Treaty in helping prod the United States toward a resumption of talks. Following Pearson's message, Wrong passed on the Canadian concerns to Hickerson and Kennan over lunch, while Thomas Stone would meet with Achilles. Hickerson, who needed no converting, was strongly onside with Wrong's position but urged patience as the State Department consultations continued. Stone, a close personal friend of Achilles⁸⁸, was also told that he should also hold for the

⁸⁶ Pearson, pp. 48 Pearson goes so far as to note that, given the Soviet intelligence (Maclean's presence), it was "undoubtedly so" that the Soviet Union relented to reduce the urgency of the security talks. Cook, 130

⁸⁷ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 26, Pearson to Wrong, 18 May 1948

⁸⁸ Devine, Ellen. Interview: 17 July 2006

Congressional support.⁸⁹ In Wrong's lunch with Kennan, the chief opponent of the alliance, Wrong challenged his arguments on two main grounds:

I said that many people in the European countries and also in Canada would not be content with a unilateral assurance of U.S. policy, which might be changed if there was a change in Administration... My second point related to the position of Canada. I said that it would be far more difficult for Canada to collaborate in planning defence against the Soviet aggression on the basis of a unilateral U.S. assurance than it would be if both countries were parties to an Atlantic agreement. Furthermore, under such an agreement the joint planning of the defence of North America fell into place as part of a larger whole and would diminish difficulties arising from fears of invasion of Canadian sovereignty by the U.S.

Wrong noted that Kennan stated that he was "much impressed by this latter argument, which had not occurred to him before".⁹⁰ Canada's diplomatic courting carried over to a dinner held for Kennan by the U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa where Claxton pushed a similar argument to Wrong's. They again found Kennan receptive to the line of argument.⁹¹ Kennan had also been impressed with the argument that Louis St. Laurent had made in the House of Commons on 28 April, noting: "...the statements of the Canadian Foreign Minister, as cited in this memorandum, add a new and important element to the problem... we should establish all the facts bearing on the possible effect of opening the question of a North Atlantic security pact."⁹² On 25 June, Wrong reported "Kennan appears to be converted".⁹³ On 25 May, Wrong noted to Pearson that St. Laurent's speech had received "wide circulation" in the State Department and had been

⁸⁹ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 8 May 2006, 497-499

⁹⁰ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 8 May 1948, pp. 497-499

⁹¹ DCER v. 14, Reid to Wrong, 3 June 1948, pp. 502-503

⁹² FRUS 1948, v. 3, Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, 24 May 1948, pp. 128-129

⁹³ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 26, Wrong to Pearson, 25 June 1948. It is important not to overstate Kennan's "conversion", however, to a degree, it is clear that the Canadian arguments contributed to his accepting the necessity of the North Atlantic Pact.

mentioned to Wrong “several times” in conversations with U.S. officials.⁹⁴ Ernest Bevin was also greatly impressed, citing St. Laurent’s arguments in the British House of Commons on 4 May.⁹⁵ Although it is important not to overstate Canadian persuasive powers, it is clear that the Canadian diplomatic “crusade” made an essential contribution to reinvigorating the NAT process.⁹⁶ As Sir Nicholas Henderson (a Second Secretary in the British Embassy in Washington) noted in his memoir of the negotiations, The Birth of NATO: “While the Americans appeared to be going backward, the Canadians moved forwards with the courage that they were to display throughout the negotiations.”⁹⁷

In the meantime, the cracks in the Canadian approach to the NAT negotiations had begun to widen. With the delays and obstacles to US participation becoming more clear, Wrong had, as early as April, begun to contemplate the idea of holding off negotiation of “the economic proposals” until 1949 to ease the negotiations.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, Reid began to further develop his concept of the treaty. On 3 June Reid sent copies of a memorandum and a draft treaty he had composed to Wrong and Norman A. Robertson (Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom) for comment. The drafts recommended that Canada support a nearly universal membership for all democratic countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, India and Pakistan for “Commonwealth unity”. Reid’s drafts included provision for a strong pledge which included “indirect aggression”. Finally, the proposal noted support for the establishment

⁹⁴ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 26, Wrong to Pearson, 25 May 1948

⁹⁵ Henderson, pp. 26

⁹⁶ Wrong would note to Pearson a 20 May British memo shown to him by Balfour noting that Kennan and Bohlen had become more receptive to the idea of a pact. (LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 26, Wrong to Pearson, 20 May 1948)

⁹⁷ Henderson, pp. 25

⁹⁸ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 25, Pearson to Wrong, 10 April 1948

of elaborate proposals to build a “North Atlantic Community”. The proposals toward a community even went so far as to suggest the creation of an assembly.⁹⁹ In response, Wrong notes: “I believe that the central thing to concentrate on now is to secure a military undertaking on the lines of paragraph 5 of the document proposed in the Pentagon talks last March with some simple general article which would cover economic collaboration...”¹⁰⁰ Robertson’s response followed a similar tone. Reid appealed to Pearson for support noting his disagreement with Wrong’s assertions and his belief that his memorandum was more closely in line with St. Laurent and Pearson’s statements.¹⁰¹

The lull in conversations came to an end when conversations resumed on 6 July 1948 in Washington. The State Department, on the back of Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s Resolution (Republican Senator from Michigan and Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), invited Canada, the UK, as well the remaining Brussels Pact powers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg¹⁰², and the Netherlands) to attend “exploratory talks” in Washington. The Vandenberg Resolution, mostly the product of secret conversations between the Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Lovett, argued four major points: (1) That the Treaty must exist within the framework of the United Nations Charter; (2) That the treaty must follow US constitutional processes; (3) It must ensure effective self-help and mutual aid, and; (4) It must contribute to US national security.¹⁰³

The treaty provided the congressional impetus for the State Department to advance

⁹⁹ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 26, Reid to Wrong, 1 June 1948

¹⁰⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 26, Wrong to Reid, 17 June 1948

¹⁰¹ DCER v. 14, Reid to Pearson, 26 June 1948, pp. 518-519

¹⁰² Although invited, Luxembourg did not have a negotiator at the WET.

¹⁰³ Vandenberg, Arthur. *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg.*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952. pp.399-410

security talks. In addition to the Vandenberg Resolution, the Berlin blockade greatly renewed the sense of urgency in the negotiations. Of the effect on the negotiations Truman noted that “Berlin had been a lesson to us all (about Russian intentions)” and that he “didn’t want to have another tragic instance of too little too late- the kind of thing that had helped Hitler subjugate Europe.”¹⁰⁴

The “Washington Exploratory Talks” consisted of five meetings from 6-9 July 1948, chaired by American Undersecretary Robert A. Lovett. Canada was represented by Pearson and Stone. The conversations were quite general and have been subsequently and aptly compared to a “Viennese minuet with the dancers approaching each other, bowing. Touching hands, retreating, turning circling and then approaching to bow again and prepare to start the dance.”¹⁰⁵ Conversations were held to discuss European actions under the Brussels Pact and estimations of Soviet policy. Henderson recalls that Lovett and the American participants in the meetings were agreed about what the US would not do, but that they could not agree on what role the US should play.¹⁰⁶ A high point in the meetings, which concluded a diplomatic encirclement of Lovett in the fifth meeting, saw Pearson draw Lovett to note that the US would not contemplate a unilateral guarantee of western security.¹⁰⁷ Henderson would later note that Pearson “gave invaluable impetus to the talks” and that Canada’s bold advocacy as a North American country greatly stimulated the talks.¹⁰⁸ This advocacy helped bridge the American sensitivities and fears

¹⁰⁴ Truman, pp. 130 & 247

¹⁰⁵ Cook, pp. 173

¹⁰⁶ Henderson, pp. 38

¹⁰⁷ FRUS 1948, v. 3, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 9 July 1948, pp. 171, For another account, see Cook, pp. 174

¹⁰⁸ Henderson, pp. 43

with the European needs. In addition, Pearson raised the importance of economic and social provisions under Article 56 within the Treaty of the UN Charter, which received agreement from Lovett.¹⁰⁹ The talks were concluded and a working party was established on a lower diplomatic level to “...draw up a program for more detailed studies based on the records of this week’s meetings.”¹¹⁰

In this way, the Canadian delegation further developed US thinking on the topic of an Atlantic Pact. It has been observed that, although the Americans sought to provide some backing of the Western Europeans, they were less clear in their thinking at this stage about the form that this would take.¹¹¹ It appears that Canada’s strong advocacy as well as conception of a reciprocal alliance helped crystallize American thinking on the topic. In this way, it contributed to a conception of the alliance apart from early American notions of Western Europe as “clients” of American support. Ernest Bevin would always highlight this Canada role in easing American doubts throughout the negotiations, particularly the role Pearson.¹¹² No doubt Pearson’s close friendships with American officials made this role easier.

The Canadian participants in the working group, which held about fifteen meetings from 12 July to 9 September 1948, were Thomas Stone and R.L. Rogers (the Third Secretary in the Canadian Embassy in Washington). The talks, held throughout a hot Washington summer, were characterized by most observers to be sluggish and mostly

¹⁰⁹ FRUS 1948, v. 3, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 9 July 1948, pp. 171

¹¹⁰ DCER v. 14, Pearson to King, 10 July 1948, pp. 530-532

¹¹¹ Henderson, pp. 38, Reid, pp. 111

¹¹² Bullock, Alan. *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. pp. 672

uneventful. Reid notes that, because no proposal was submitted for discussion, the talks “...resulted in diffuse discussions, confusion- and a slow rate of progress which was probably what the United States wanted”.¹¹³ Pearson speculates in his memoirs that this was the case because many State Department officials expected a Thomas Dewey victory in the November elections, and were therefore reluctant to allow the conversations to advance too far.¹¹⁴

The sluggish approach, however, was also shared by the Europeans. On 23 July Wrong wrote to Pearson that he had feared that the European procrastination would remove the State Department’s “first blush of enthusiasm”.¹¹⁵ Pearson responded that the European procrastination was “profoundly wrong and shortsighted” and that the Europeans may be missing a very rare opportunity to develop a genuine regional security system.¹¹⁶ Pearson sought to reinvigorate the talks by instructing his Ambassador in The Hague, Pierre Dupuy, to raise the status of the talks with the Dutch leadership, emphasizing the unique opportunity it presented.¹¹⁷ Particularly Belgium and France emphasized the urgent need for military aid rather than an elaborate security arrangement.¹¹⁸ French Ambassador Henri Bonnet went so far as to issue “conditions” on French participation, including US military aid in the form of supplies and troops, as well as a seat on the US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff.¹¹⁹ Tensions came to a head on 20 August, when Lovett held a meeting at his residence as a means of relieving tensions.

¹¹³ Reid, pp. 55

¹¹⁴ Pearson, pp. 50

¹¹⁵ DCER v. 14, Wrong to Pearson, 23 July 1948, pp. 536-537

¹¹⁶ DCER v. 14, Pearson to Wrong, 27 July 1948, pp. 537

¹¹⁷ DCER v. 14, Pearson to Dupuy, 4 August 1948, pp. 548-550

¹¹⁸ Henderson, pp. 52

¹¹⁹ Henderson, pp. 52

Ambassador Silvercruys of Belgium noted that he felt that the working party might not be addressing the “basic question... whether, for example, a North Atlantic Pact of some sort was necessary or whether some defensive arrangement could be made without having a North Atlantic Pact”. He passed this question to Lovett and Pearson¹²⁰. Both Pearson and Lovett answered that an Atlantic Pact was necessary. All countries except France agreed that the response greatly clarified their understanding of the negotiations.¹²¹ French concerns were later disarmed when the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the shipment of military equipment to the French from existing stocks.¹²²

Talks picked up to a degree and the Working Group meetings concluded with an “agreed statement” on 9 September, which set out the general lines of a treaty. The most active members of the Working Group were Hickerson, Derick Hoyer-Millar (of the British Embassy in Washington) and Stone.¹²³ The proposal included consideration of issues surrounding membership, the pledge and provisions for general welfare. On the issue of membership, it noted that “it might be desirable” for Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland and Ireland to receive original membership. Sweden, Italy and French North Africa were also given consideration. The efforts of Thomas Stone resulted in a provision for “encouragement of collaboration in economic, social and cultural fields”. Canada faced its first strong opposition, however, from the Brussels powers, unwilling to observe the duplication of existing organizations like the Organization for European

¹²⁰ Pearson, although not a participant in the Working Group discussions, visited Washington to participate in these critical talks.

¹²¹ FRUS 1948, v. 3, Twelfth Meeting of the Working Group, 20 August 1948, pp. 214-221 For the Canadian account of the meeting see: DCER v. 14, Pearson Memorandum, 20 August 1948, pp. 577-581 or

¹²² LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5, file 29, Wrong Memo of Conversation with Hickerson, 1 October 1948

¹²³ Cook, pp. 178

Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Finally, three important alternatives were presented on the issue of the pledge: the Rio formula, favoured by the United States; the Brussels formula, favoured by the European representatives and a compromise position, for which the Canadian representatives had voiced some support.¹²⁴ The statement was taken back to the governments for review. On 6 October, the Canadian cabinet announced its support for a North Atlantic Treaty along the lines of the 9 September proposals.¹²⁵

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There would be another lull in talks from 9 September to 10 December, when “exploratory talks” resumed again in Washington. This lull was the result primarily of two factors. The first was the US elections in November 1948, especially since the State Department officials thought President Truman would not win the election.¹²⁶ President Truman’s Democrats, however, did win the election and gained a majority in Congress.¹²⁷ By this period, the notion of military backing of Western Europe had become a mainstream assumption in American politics. By early November, US negotiators were eager to resume conversations for the conclusion of a treaty, in part because President Truman wanted to cite the NAT in his inauguration speech.¹²⁸ Further delays, however, were experienced while the Brussels Pact Permanent Commission

¹²⁴ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 4, file 27, Wrong Memo, 9 September 1948

¹²⁵ DCER v. 14, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 6 October 1948, pp. 611-614

¹²⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5, file 30, Wrong to SSEA, 1 November 1948

¹²⁷ Cook, pp. 197-198

¹²⁸ Cook, pp. 200-201 Cook credits the work of Lovett, Marshall, Vandenberg and Truman in slowly nurturing the American public opinion toward the widespread support the NAT received by the end of 1948.

prepared its directives to the Ambassadors in Washington.¹²⁹ The directives were not complete until the end of November and reflected a significant degree of disagreement among its authors. Wrong would reflect that the Permanent Commission had taken a long time to produce little and that it, more than anything, reflected French preoccupations.¹³⁰

During this period, changes were also coming in the Canadian Department of External Affairs. As noted by Reid, from 7 October to 17 December, Pearson would only be in Ottawa a total of four days because of his move to politics and role as head of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations.¹³¹ As a result of the transitions, Reid became the senior policy advisor in Ottawa for a period of roughly six months from October 1948 to March 1949. This left him in the position to draft instructions to officials more experienced than him.¹³² The impact of this is unclear. Reid notes that had Pearson been in Ottawa, Canada would have been more able to influence the negotiations.¹³³ In contrast, James Eayrs in his In Defence of Canada notes that Pearson seemed to be somewhat “put-off” by Reid’s tenacity.¹³⁴ Both comments are speculation, but the one clear result of this shift is a certain ambiguity to the Canadian position.

In the period of lull, Reid again began to draft memos furiously in an effort to provide three documents of instructions for Wrong.¹³⁵ Based on comments, Reid developed three

¹²⁹ Henderson, pp. 65-66

¹³⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to Reid, 14 December 1948

¹³¹ Reid, pp. 230

¹³² Chapnick, pp. 171

¹³³ Reid, pp. 230

¹³⁴ Eayrs, pp. 103n

¹³⁵ DCER v. 14, Memorandum for Acting SSEA, 26 November 1948

drafts of the Canadian commentary on the 9 September proposals. The final draft, which had grown to an unwieldy 36 paragraphs in length, was sent to Wrong and Norman Robertson on 6 November.¹³⁶ On 9 November Robertson responded that Reid's paper was "written in larger language than is appropriate or required" and that he would "... cut out all the three-decker phrases (three in paragraph 2), most of the double-barreled ones, and any remaining echoes from the Anglican prayer book."¹³⁷ On 12 November Wrong urged Reid to tone down the language, shorten the draft, and remember the need for urgency.¹³⁸ In response, Reid sent a copy to now Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in an effort to gain his support.¹³⁹ Wrong issued further comments on 19 November: "I am most anxious at this stage that we should stick to the central purpose in these negotiations, which is, to put it bluntly, the creation of a military alliance encircling the North Atlantic."¹⁴⁰ Reid then received his requested feedback from Arnold Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council Office, voiced similar concerns and added: "...we should not take too leading a part in the negotiations until we have more definite indications of what our treaty obligations are to be in men, money and materials... There is, in my view, real danger that we may be open to the charge of speaking loudly but carrying a pretty small twig."¹⁴¹ Reid's appeals to Pearson in Paris resulted in an affirmation of Wrong's judgment on matters relating to treaty negotiation and US opinion.¹⁴² As a result of

¹³⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5, file 30, Reid to Wrong, 6 November 1948

¹³⁷ DCER v. 14, Robertson to Wrong, 9 November 1948, pp. 640-641

¹³⁸ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5, file 30, Wrong to Reid, 12 November 1948

¹³⁹ DCER v. 14, Reid to St. Laurent, 16 November 1948, pp. 668

¹⁴⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5, file 30, Wrong to Reid, 19 November 1948

¹⁴¹ DCER v. 14, Heeney to Wrong, 20 November 1948, pp. 674-676

¹⁴² DCER v. 14, Pearson to Reid, 23 November 1948, pp. 684-685

further feedback, Reid's final draft of 1 December was much simpler and shorter.¹⁴³

With cabinet approval, this document became the confidential instructions for Wrong.¹⁴⁴

The Washington talks resumed on 6 December 1948, with Robert Lovett communicating his desire to conclude an agreement as soon as possible by focusing on drafting a treaty text. He immediately welcomed the Brussels Pact Permanent Commission draft proposals as a means of accelerating discussions.¹⁴⁵ As noted above, Reid had set out to prepare three sets of instructions for Wrong. In light of the surprise in Lovett's approach, Wrong requested greater flexibility in the negotiations to enable his "capacity in seeking to compromise conflicting views..."¹⁴⁶ Wrong reiterated this view on 14 December.¹⁴⁷ Reid appealed to Pearson, claiming that he felt Wrong needed greater direction from Ottawa. As an alternative, and to diffuse Reid, Pearson offered to deliver a letter to Wrong, which Reid would draft and he would sign, for further instruction.¹⁴⁸ This note was not signed by Pearson, but given to Wrong on 29 December "for information".¹⁴⁹ Wrong's resistance to Reid's restrictive instructions is understandable given both the nature of the discussions and the Department of External Affairs. The informal and flexible nature of the meetings may have been inconsistent

¹⁴³ DCER v. 14, Reid Memorandum, 1 December 1948, pp. 698-700

¹⁴⁴ DCER v. 14, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 1 December 1948, pp. 701-702

¹⁴⁵ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to Reid, 10 December 1948

¹⁴⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to Reid, 11 December 1948

¹⁴⁷ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to Reid, 14 December 1948

¹⁴⁸ Reid, pp. 230

¹⁴⁹ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Pearson to Wrong, 16 December 1948. Reid notes in A time of Hope and Fear that he discovered this note in Wrong's Papers in 1975. Reid, pp. 277

with the overly detailed and restrictive instructions that Reid proposed.¹⁵⁰ Secondly, as F.H. Soward notes:

...it was keeping with the nature of the growth of the Department and the intimacy and complete understanding which characterized the relations of the three senior officers who took up their new posts that no one ever thought of preparing a formal letter of instructions for the High Commissioner and Ambassador. Similarly, it would not have occurred to the retiring Undersecretary to put on paper an analysis of current problems and policies for his successor.¹⁵¹

Given the context of Departmental informality among the most senior officials and Reid's junior position relative to Wrong, the response is more understandable.

As Pearson notes, at the December meetings, Wrong did have explicit instructions on two issues: the nature of the pledge and an article for general welfare. Wrong had somewhat more flexible instructions on issues of membership and treaty area.¹⁵² Wrong was instructed to pursue a pledge that was as strong as the United States was willing to entertain, ideally as close as possible to the formula contained within the Brussels Treaty. On the issue of General Welfare, Wrong was encouraged to pursue provision for making the treaty something more than a merely negative document, but a "dynamic counter-attraction to totalitarian communism". This provision should encourage economic collaboration toward combined production of goods. On the issues of membership, Canada accepted original membership for Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland; allowed special arrangements which could be made for Italian defence to ensure

¹⁵⁰ In a revealing note of January 1949, Wrong describes the freedom and informality of the Working Group meetings. (LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 32, Wrong to Reid, 17 January 1949)

¹⁵¹ Hilliker, pp. 7

¹⁵² Pearson, pp. 54-55

its strategic position; and remained silent on Portuguese membership, which represented a Canadian retreat from strong opposition at previous negotiations.¹⁵³

On the issue of the pledge, George Kennan announced that the State Department had decided that the pledge should be stronger than that contained in the Rio Treaty.¹⁵⁴ In the text, the US had accepted the specific mention that, in the event of aggression, the contracting parties would take “military or other action”.¹⁵⁵ The specific mention of military action was of great significance. The new draft also eliminated any reference to the right of a signatory to determine if aggression had occurred, as well as any reference to assistance being predicated on each country’s constitutional processes.¹⁵⁶ Finally, this military aid would be provided in strategic defence of the North Atlantic area, and not necessarily in defence of the victim of aggression. All governments pledged their enthusiastic support for this draft, and it was included in the report of 24 December. Still Kennan cautioned that they had not yet sought Congressional reaction to the pledge.¹⁵⁷

On the issue of general welfare, the Canadian delegation faced much stronger opposition from the Brussels powers than they had anticipated when Wrong first raised the issue on 13 December.¹⁵⁸ The Brussels powers renewed their opposition and insisted that this general article not conflict with existing international organizations.¹⁵⁹ This opposition, as noted by Charles Ritchie in November was probably more grounded in

¹⁵³ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Commentary on the Washington Paper of September 9, 1948, 6 December 1948.

¹⁵⁴ Henderson, pp. 70

¹⁵⁵ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Working Group Minutes, 16 December 1948

¹⁵⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Draft Agreement, 24 December 1948

¹⁵⁷ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Working Group Minutes, 17 December 1948

¹⁵⁸ FRUS 1948, v. 3, Ninth Meeting of Washington Exploratory Talks, pp. 334-335

¹⁵⁹ DCER v. 14, Wrong to SSEA, 17 December 1948, pp. 744-746

European concerns that "... an elaboration of the functions of an 'Atlantic community' would seriously interfere with the attempts which were now being made to organize closer Western European unity."¹⁶⁰ This theory is supported by Jebb's recollections in his memoirs.¹⁶¹ Through Wrong's arguments and strong US support, nevertheless, an article was inserted into the December drafts stating that parties would encourage "collaboration in cultural, economic and social fields". The European opposition, however, only agreed to its inclusion if it was stated that this work be "undertaken through and assist the work of existing international organizations."¹⁶²

The Canadian position on membership was considerably more flexible. Canada had been softly opposed to Italian membership, principally because Italy could not contribute much to North Atlantic defence and because it was not a North Atlantic country.¹⁶³ Little agreement was established in the December meetings over the Italian question.¹⁶⁴ Although Canada initially opposed Portuguese membership because of its undemocratic government, this opposition was dropped because of its strategic position (especially the Azores Islands).¹⁶⁵ The French showed themselves strong on the inclusion of French North Africa, consisting of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. This was opposed by the Canadian delegation and remained unresolved.¹⁶⁶ It was agreed that approaches would be made to Iceland, Norway, Ireland and Portugal in the New Year.¹⁶⁷ Most of the

¹⁶⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 30, Ritchie Memorandum for SSEA, 17 November 1948

¹⁶¹ Jebb, pp. 220

¹⁶² LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Draft Agreement, 24 December 1948

¹⁶³ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Commentary on the Washington Paper of September 9, 1948, 6 December 1948

¹⁶⁴ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to SSEA, 10 December 1948

¹⁶⁵ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to SSEA, 13 December 1948

¹⁶⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Working Group Minutes, 17 December 1948

¹⁶⁷ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 31, Wrong to SSEA, 24 December 1948

proposals were essentially drafted by Hickerson, Achilles and Kennan, with “crucial input from the Canadians.”¹⁶⁸

Following the submission of the 24 December draft, the Canadian and Brussels Pact governments quickly noted support for the progress of negotiations and anticipation of the earliest completion of the talks. In the first weeks of January the State Department made initial approaches to the Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, Irish and Portuguese governments and began to sound out Congressional opinion on the December draft text.¹⁶⁹ The working party would also meet several times, making some small amendments to the December drafts.¹⁷⁰

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Change, however, was coming in Washington, which would delay higher level talks until February. With Truman’s inauguration on 20 January 1949, Secretary of State General Marshall and Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett retired from their posts. Dean Acheson returned from private life to assume the position of Secretary of State and began consultation with the Senate.¹⁷¹ Since Acheson had not been involved in the talks, he did not have an intimate knowledge or a feel for the negotiations.¹⁷² Change also came to the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee as Senator Tom Connally of

¹⁶⁸ Cook, pp. 203

¹⁶⁹ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 32, Wrong to Reid, 5 January 1949

¹⁷⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 32, Wrong to Reid, 12 January 1949

¹⁷¹ Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. , Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. pp. 277

¹⁷² Cook, pp. 208, Henderson, pp. 82, Reid, pp. 68

Texas replaced Vandenberg as committee Chair. Connally, by many accounts, was sore about being “taken for granted” throughout the consultation processes while his age “added more to his limitations than his virtues”.¹⁷³ Additionally, by many accounts, Vandenberg, still an important member of the Foreign Relations Committee, “sulked” over the Republican defeat and his loss of Chairmanship of the Senate committee.¹⁷⁴

At the very least, the diplomatic chemistry of Marshall, Lovett and Vandenberg was lost. Vandenberg and Acheson did not get on that well as Vandenberg confides in his diaries: “I am frank to say that Mr. Acheson would not have been my choice for Secretary of State.”¹⁷⁵ In early February Acheson made his first consultation with Connally and Vandenberg, who immediately attacked the wording of the pledge, now Article 5 of the 24 December proposals. The Senators insisted on the deletion of “military or other action as may be necessary”, and insisted the re-insertion of a clause relating action being predicated on “constitutional processes”. By 5 February word began to circulate of Acheson’s troubles, causing anxiety among the negotiators.¹⁷⁶ Things would get worse. On Valentines Day 1949, isolationist Senator Forrest Donnell would coax Senator Connally into a blow-up on the Senate floor: “We cannot be Sir Galahads, and every time we hear a gun fired plunge into war and take sides without knowing what we are doing and without knowing the issues involved.”¹⁷⁷ Combined with a series of press leakages, Acheson had a full-blown crisis that threatened to

¹⁷³ Cook, pp. 200

¹⁷⁴ Cook, pp. 208

¹⁷⁵ Vandenberg, pp. 469

¹⁷⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Reid, 5 February 1949

¹⁷⁷ Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. , pp. 282

emasculate the treaty, while Hickerson and Achilles became “depressed and discouraged.”¹⁷⁸

On 1 March, Acheson mentioned at the working group meetings that the consultations with Senate opinion had not gone as far as he had expected prior to his appointment, and he asked patience of the negotiations.¹⁷⁹ Privately, Wrong communicated the Canadian arguments for maintenance of a strong Article 5 by arguing that since the text was already well-known to the public, a late change would irreversibly damage the prestige of the treaty and aid Soviet propaganda.¹⁸⁰ Oliver Franks (who had replaced Inverchapel as the British Ambassador) also took a similar tack in his conversations with Acheson.¹⁸¹ Both Wrong and Franks, close personal friends of Acheson, were able to receive a sympathetic ear.¹⁸² Pearson went so far as to authorize Wrong to state that, if the pledge was not strengthened, the Canadian government would reexamine its position and that “it is better to have no treaty at all than to have one that is so weak and ambiguous as to be meaningless and therefore mischievous...”¹⁸³ This was Canada’s ultimate threat; thankfully one that would not have to be uttered.

¹⁷⁸ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Reid, 15 February 1949

¹⁷⁹ FRUS 1949 v. IV, *14th Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks*, pp. 126-136. LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Reid, 9 February 1949

¹⁸⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Reid, 5 February 1949

¹⁸¹ Henderson, pp. 92-93

¹⁸² In his Memoirs, Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. notes that his family’s relationship with the Wrong family went back two generations and how close his friendship was with Franks. (Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. , pp. 277) It is also known that the Canadian Minister in Washington Tommy Stone also shared a close friendship with Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. .

¹⁸³ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Pearson to Wrong, 17 February 1949

Secretly, Acheson saw President Truman on the issue and they worked out several alternative versions of the pledge. Truman also resolved to meet with Connally privately and discuss his concerns.¹⁸⁴ Whether it was because of Truman's approach, the bad press, or further consideration, shortly thereafter Connally accepted an alternate wording not entirely different than the text to which he had originally objected.¹⁸⁵ The alternative text sought to replace "military or other action" with "action, including the use of armed force", while deferring to the Senators in their insistence on the phrase "as it deems necessary."¹⁸⁶ This wording was immediately popular to the negotiators, and Wrong who advocated for the Canadian government's support.¹⁸⁷

Meanwhile, Pearson instructed Wrong to push stronger terms for Article 2. On 10 February Pearson and Reid provided Wrong with a pair of drafts which expanded the scope of Article 2.¹⁸⁸ On 7 February Wrong learned privately that the Senators and Acheson did not favour the article and sought its deletion. Wrong cautioned Pearson that the best he might be able to obtain was the existing language as well as a mention in the preamble, with particular caution on the prospects of including more detailed language on economic collaboration.¹⁸⁹ With Pearson's urging, Wrong continued to push the case to Acheson, with specific reference to Canadian domestic political

¹⁸⁴ Cook, pp. 214

¹⁸⁵ Cook, pp. 214, Henderson, pp. 91-92. Cook gives the credit to Truman noting: "Harry Truman's leadership preserved a viable North Atlantic Treaty. Henderson, although likely not knowing of Truman's secret meeting, notes that because his speech met with "poor reception in the American press... From that time on he was more malleable in his talks with Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. than he had been hitherto."

¹⁸⁶ DCER v. 15, Pearson to Wrong, 17 February 1949, pp. 528-531

¹⁸⁷ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Pearson and Reid, 21 February 1949

¹⁸⁸ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, SSEA to Wrong, 7 February 1949

¹⁸⁹ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Pearson and Reid, 21 February 1949

considerations.¹⁹⁰ This perspective was emphasized at the highest level by Prime Minister St. Laurent in a meeting with President Truman in Washington on 12 February.¹⁹¹ Pearson and Reid also sought to strengthen Canada's negotiating position by instructing the Canadian Ambassadors in Paris, Brussels and The Hague to communicate the importance of strengthening the article to the Canadian public.¹⁹² Concurrently, Norman Robertson raised the matter in London, except he sought to cultivate support from the Canada-United Kingdom trade committee.¹⁹³ By 22 February, the Canadians had received soft support from the British and Belgians, and support "to the hilt" from France and The Netherlands.¹⁹⁴ Wrong would seek to bring this new-found support to bear on Acheson.

Wrong emphasized that the article was so important politically to the Canadian Government, particularly in Quebec, that it would review its participation in the treaty. He also began to discuss with Hickerson, Achilles and Douglas alternative wordings for Article 2.¹⁹⁵ On 24 February, the alternative wording was accepted by Acheson, Connally and Vandenberg representing a conglomeration of a number of versions, including a sentence in Article 55 of the UN Charter.¹⁹⁶ It has been noted that Wrong's close relationship with Acheson may have been a key factor in Acheson's concession.¹⁹⁷ Reid encouraged Wrong to seek greater concessions to strengthen the

¹⁹⁰ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Pearson, 7 February 1949

¹⁹¹ DCER v. 15, Wrong Memorandum, 12 February 1949, pp. 526-527

¹⁹² DCER v. 15, , SSEA to Ambassadors in France, Belgium and The Netherlands, 17 February 1949, pp. 527-528

¹⁹³ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, SSEA to Wrong, 17 February 1949

¹⁹⁴ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong Memorandum, 22 February 1949

¹⁹⁵ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong Memorandum, 22 February 1949

¹⁹⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong Memorandum, 24 February 1949

¹⁹⁷ Pearson, Geoffrey. pp. 46

article. Wrong, however, with a clearer sense of the negotiations, notified Acheson and the Ambassadors of his support for the present text.¹⁹⁸ On 27 February Pearson conceded that the text may be “as strong as we can secure... and is therefore acceptable as it now stands.”¹⁹⁹

A considerable debate in the Canadian historiography exists in its interpretation of Canada’s advocacy of Article 2. Reid’s suggests that Wrong was both out of touch with Canadian political realities and had let his personal skepticism over the utility of the article get in the way.²⁰⁰ Others, like Chapnick and Eayrs have sought to provide a more balanced assessment.²⁰¹ Pearson also reflects in his Memoirs that Wrong’s advocacy of article 2 was “the essence of effective diplomacy.”²⁰² Reid’s analysis was probably written with the knowledge that the article has since fallen into disuse. As Hector Mackenzie, however, notes in his essay: “...the real failure of article 2 was its implementation, not its drafting.”²⁰³ This essay agrees wholeheartedly with this assessment. Although Canada had secured strong support from the Brussels nations for the strengthening of the article, this support was soft. A conversation between Charles Ritchie and officials in Paris also reveals that French officials were surprised by Britain’s opposition to a non-military article. They noted the Article’s utility in disarming criticism that the treaty was aggressive.²⁰⁴ Even eventual British support may have been connected to as “quid pro quo” for support for a British proposal to provide assurance for

¹⁹⁸ DCER v. 15, Wrong to SSEA, 25 February 1949, pp. 546-549

¹⁹⁹ DCER v. 15, Pearson to Wrong, 27 February 1949, pp. 550-552

²⁰⁰ Reid, pp. 232-233

²⁰¹ Eayrs, pp. 104 & Chapnick, pp. 176-178

²⁰² Pearson, pp. 47

²⁰³ Mackenzie, pp. 163

²⁰⁴ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 5 file 30, Ritchie Memorandum for SSEA, 17 November 1948

Greece and Turkey.²⁰⁵ In the negotiations, it was even emphasized that, from a US point of view, the article was “a general article...at worst harmless”.²⁰⁶ To a significant degree, as John Milloy notes, the Canadian insistence on the article for political justifications ensured that the draft was seen as a favour to the Canadians exclusively for political sensibilities.²⁰⁷ This widespread interpretation is also supported by some of the military planning subsequent to the treaty’s adoption where NATO is repeatedly referred to as a “...purely military organization”.²⁰⁸

Having secured compromises on Articles 2 & 5, the final important aspect of the negotiations for Wrong was to resolve the issues surrounding membership. The issue of Italian Membership became much more complex when the Italian government publicly requested membership in the NAT. Wrong conceded that a rebuff would now be much more “complicated” and that membership should now be supported.²⁰⁹ Irish participation, however, was complicated when, on 7 February, Sean McBride (the Irish Minister of External Affairs) requested Pearson’s support in securing Irish membership by pressuring Britain for Partition.²¹⁰ Somewhat embarrassed, Pearson responded that this was not the forum to discuss partition. Eventually Irish participation was discarded on these grounds. There was some uncertainty surrounding Norway and Denmark’s participation in the pact, as Sweden sought to negotiate a Scandinavian neutrality pact. With the Scandinavian pact’s failure, Norway and Denmark became original

²⁰⁵ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Robertson to Reid, 21 February 1949

²⁰⁶ LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 33, Wrong to Pearson and Reid, 21 February 1949

²⁰⁷ Milloy, John. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1948-1952: Community or Alliance*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queens University press 2006. pp. 32

²⁰⁸ DHH, Foulkes Papers, Col. Rayment to Lt- Gen. Foulkes, 22 April 1949.

²⁰⁹ DCER v. 15, Wrong to SSEA, 15 January 1949, pp. 501-502.

²¹⁰ DCER v. 15, McBride to Pearson, 7 February 1949, pp. 518-521.

signatories.²¹¹ The intransigent French insistence on the inclusion of North Africa was reduced to the inclusion of Algeria. The governments elected to discreetly interpret Algeria as part of French proper and therefore as part of the treaty.²¹²

On 18 March the NAT text was published to encourage some public discussion. As Acheson notes, however, it was also seen as a means of ensuring ratification by the proposed signatories.²¹³ Despite this, Reid produced a set of thirty drafting changes to the NAT text to be circulated.²¹⁴ Wrong's immediate response was that these changes should not be circulated given the late stage of negotiations.²¹⁵ Pearson backed Reid and the changes were circulated. On 29 March, Wrong reported to Pearson that all of Reid's proposed amendments were rejected by the Ambassadors.²¹⁶ The suggestions were dropped. On 4 April the NAT treaty was signed by the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified in the Canadian Parliament on 29 April 1949, the first among the allies.

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This paper has assessed the significance of Canada's participation in the NAT negotiations of 1948-1949 through a detailed assessment of the primary documents. The

²¹¹ DCER v. 15, Wrong to Pearson, 25 February 1949, pp. 549-550.

²¹² LAC, Wrong Papers, vol. 6 file 32, Stone to Reid, 24 January 1949

²¹³ Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My years at the State Department*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. , pp. 282

²¹⁴ DCER v. 15, Reid to Wrong, 23 March 1949, pp. 590-594.

²¹⁵ DCER v. 15, Wrong to SSEA, 24 March 1949, pp. 595.

²¹⁶ DCER v. 15, Wrong to SSEA, 29 March 1949, pp. 599.

Canadian part has been both overstated and understated in the Canadian historiography. This paper has sought to deepen the existing scholarship by providing a fresh interpretation of Canada's participation by centering on the systemic and personal factors within the Canadian Department of External Affairs that contributed to Canada's participation in the negotiations. Although difficult to quantify, the role of personalities in augmenting and amplifying Canadian influence is a unique factor of this era in Canadian diplomacy. What is clear is that, although the North Atlantic Treaty was built upon American power, it was far from inevitable and, through close friendships and subtle suggestion, Canadian diplomats played an important role in the origins of the alliance.

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